Аудиторы: FEMA не обеспечила контроль общественных работ в DTOP

The DHS Office of Inspector General is the internal oversight layer of the Department of Homeland Security over components like FEMA. For Puerto Rico, its capacity audits of PA funds post-María are required reading if one wants to talk about the risk of non-compliance without confusing a control finding with criminal conviction. A primary example in HTML: the report OIG-20-25 (April 9, 2020), Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Transportation and Public Works, available at oig.dhs.gov.

The OIG executive summary states that Williams-Adley determined that FEMA did not always ensure that the Department of Transportation and Public Works (DTOP) established and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to account for and spend PA funds in accordance with federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. In particular, DTOP lacked (1) an effective grants management process; (2) sufficient internal controls in procurement; and (3) adequate controls over Force Account Labor. The stated cause: FEMA and COR3 did not properly oversee DTOP's grant management activities. The OIG issued three recommendations; FEMA agreed.

That language matters. The report talks about the risk of noncompliance, potentially non-reimbursable costs, and control weakness — not a theft conviction. In Borinquen, the distinction accusation ≠ conviction and audit finding ≠ proven embezzlement in court is professional ethics. The journalistic value of OIG-20-25 is showing that, early in the grant cycle, the inspector general was already documenting capacity gaps in a key road infrastructure applicant.

The OIG ecosystem regarding PR/FEMA is broader: there are parallel capacity audits on the Department of Housing (OIG-20-22) and the Department of Education (OIG-20-26), among other PDFs on the site. More recently, the report OIG-25-39 (September 2025) on technical assistance to rebuild the electrical grid after María states, in its public summary, that FEMA obligated more than $13 billion for that grid reconstruction purpose and that it did not ensure timely rebuilding in accordance with regulations and guidelines — pointing out insufficient technical assistance to PREPA for scopes of work and detailed work plans, within the framework of the PA Alternative Procedures (Section 428) and the FAASt strategy. That figure of 'more than $13 billion' is labeled in the OIG account as obligation toward the grid; it should not be re-labeled as disbursed nor as theft.

How to use OIG at the table: (1) download the primary HTML or PDF, not a third-party summary; (2) cite the report number, date, and whether FEMA concurred; (3) separate open recommendations from closed ones when the site allows; (4) cross-check the audited applicant (DTOP, PRDE, PRDOH, PREPA) with rows from OpenFEMA PA Details to see the trail of obligated PWs from the same universe; (5) never turn a capacity audit into a police chronicle without judicial evidence.

The HTML record for OIG-20-25 adds useful metadata for citation: Report Number OIG-20-25, Issue Date 04/09/2020, Document File OIG-20-25-Apr20.pdf, DHS Agency FEMA, Oversight Area Disaster Recovery, keywords Transportation and Public Works, Fiscal Year 2020. The PDF contracted with Williams Adley specifies that DTOP, during the covered period, did not have written grants management policies nor a central coordination point; that staff lacked the required procurement training; and that they did not understand FEMA requirements for claiming compensatory time. The described risk is twofold: contracting with excluded parties ineligible for reimbursement, and using federal funds for unsupported or unallowed purposes. Risk described by the auditor ≠ quantified loss in this note: the HTML summary does not publish a dollar amount of questioned costs here, and we do not invent it.

The context of the 2020 capacity audits is temporary: they were conducted early in the grant cycle to identify where COR3 and the applicants needed more technical assistance. OIG-20-22 (March 2020) on the Department of Housing found weaknesses in Force Account Labor and timesheet controls; OIG-20-26 (April 2020) on Education noted delays in emergency work and in reimbursement requests, with the auditor citing —with a cutoff of December 14, 2018— that FEMA had obligated $321,629,430 in PA to PRDE under 17 Project Worksheets for emergency work. That figure from OIG-20-26 has a cutoff date and the label “obliged / obligated”; we do not recycle it as a 2026 total nor as a disbursement.

OIG-25-39 (September 2025) updates the grid thread: FEMA initially funded emergency repairs and then the reconstruction of the network, directing more than $13 billion toward that purpose. Puerto Rico used PA Alternative Procedures (Section 428); FEMA designed FAASt in 2019 to estimate by asset categories and extrapolate. The finding is not that the money “disappeared”: it is that technical assistance for statements of work and work plans was lacking. FEMA Region 2 agreed to provide additional training to COR3, PREPA, and affiliates, with an estimated completion date of December 31, 2025, according to the response cited in the report. The journalist of 2026 can ask whether that date was met, without turning the finding into a criminal verdict.

For the transparency of recovery, OIG and OpenFEMA complement each other. OpenFEMA shows the obligation pipeline; OIG shows whether applicant controls and FEMA oversight were adequate. DHS provides the institutional framework; the Puerto Rico hub guides the citizen; the statements set the DR. Together they form the minimum kit for a disaster journalist in the Caribbean. Cousin: 749. Topic: politics. Primary source: page OIG-20-25 on oig.dhs.gov.