Dengue 2024 à Porto Rico : 6 291 cas et 11 décès, selon le CDC

On September 14, 2026, this table anchors the MMWR «Dengue Outbreak and Response — Puerto Rico, 2024», published on February 20, 2025 (74(5);54–60). It is not a new bulletin of the day; it is the official CDC and Department of Health account of the first major dengue outbreak on the Island since 2013. Its usefulness in September 2026 is for health governance: it documents cases, hospitalizations, deaths, serotypes, and the vector control menu that remains the current infrastructure.

During 2024, 6,291 confirmed cases of dengue were reported. The municipalities with the most cases were San Juan (1,200; 17.3%), Carolina (354; 5.1%), and Rincón (252; 3.6%). The DENV-3 serotype predominated, with 59.2% of the cases with a known serotype. Approximately half of the patients — 52.3% — required hospitalization. Severe cases accounted for 4.2% (264), and there were 11 deaths (0.2%). People aged 10 to 19 concentrated 33.9% of hospitalizations and 28.4% of severe cases.

The Department of Health declared a public health emergency in March 2024 when weekly cases exceeded the epidemic threshold based on 30 years of surveillance. In collaboration with the CDC, enhanced surveillance, bite prevention campaigns, and vector control were activated. The MMWR notes an 11-year gap since the last declared outbreak (2013), attributed in part to temporary cross-immunity following the 2016 Zika virus and to reduced exposure during COVID-19. That hypothesis is from the report; it is not causal proof.

The response of the Puerto Rico Vector Control Unit, coordinated with PRDH and CDC, included broad-area larvicide, mass traps, adulticides (space and residual sprays), yard inspections, weekly health surveys, and USDA guidance on pesticide use in high-risk or resistant areas. In September 2024, PRDH created an advisory committee on Integrated Vector Management that recommended rotating insecticides and evaluating them periodically.

The MMWR also reminds that Dengvaxia is recommended for people aged 9 to 16 who live in endemic areas of the U.S. and who have confirmed prior infection. There is no antiviral treatment; management involves early recognition, triage, supportive care, and follow-up. Recommendations for residents and visitors include repellents, protective clothing, and places with mosquito nets. These measures do not replace environmental control or clinical care.

Why publish it on September 14, 2026? Because the typical transmission season (July–November) is still active, the CDC file and the HRSA/HHS awards from this same series show post-Zika institutional continuity, and the 2024 outbreak is still the most complete official quantitative reference. The MMWR does not publish a total of dollars spent in 2024. Inventing a response budget would be false. The value of the source is epidemiological and operational.

The MONEY/news typology here is not a grant line-item: it is evidence to decide where to put traps, larvicide, personnel, and education. A 52.3% hospitalization rate implies pressure on beds and clinical costs; 11 deaths are deaths, not abstract statistics. But hospitalization is not an automatic federal disbursement, and local emergency is not a supplemental appropriation from Congress.

This MMWR should not be confused either with the April 2026 EID study on AGO traps for Zika (seroprevalence 9.6% vs 20.0%) nor with the archived $13 million award that VCU created in 2016. They are different layers: an outbreak report, an intervention assessment, and a foundational award. Adding them up as a single 2026 program erases accountability.

Summary of September 14: 6,291 cases, 52.3% hospitalized, 264 severe, 11 deaths, DENV-3 dominant, peak in adolescents, emergency in March 2024, and an explicit vector control menu. The MMWR remains the compass; not a check.